Iran strikes on AWS data centers prompt call for US digital defense framework
Iranian attacks on Amazon Web Services infrastructure in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain highlight a gap in American national security doctrine, according to an opinion piece by Kate Monroe. The author argues that…
Iranian attacks on Amazon Web Services infrastructure in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain highlight a gap in American national security doctrine, according to an opinion piece by Kate Monroe. The author argues that the United States must expand its definition of critical infrastructure to include privately owned digital assets located overseas, as traditional geographic borders no longer fully protect national interests.
Monroe notes that in March, Iranian strikes damaged AWS data centers and related infrastructure in the UAE and Bahrain. Reuters reported that this damage contributed to service disruptions and an extended recovery process. In April, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps publicly claimed it targeted an Amazon cloud-computing facility in Bahrain. This distinction is significant because Iran explicitly identified American commercial computing infrastructure as a target, rather than a facility caught in crossfire. The author contends that such actions demonstrate that adversaries view digital infrastructure as a legitimate military objective.
The piece emphasizes that American power increasingly depends on privately operated systems, including data centers, cloud-computing systems, and telecommunications networks. The military relies on commercial technology for logistics and planning, while financial institutions, hospitals, and energy providers depend on interconnected digital systems to maintain operations. Artificial intelligence, which requires substantial computing capacity, is becoming central to both the economy and national defense. Monroe argues that the destruction of a single data center could have consequences extending far beyond the operating company, potentially disrupting military logistics, financial markets, or critical communications.
Federal law currently defines critical infrastructure broadly to include physical or virtual systems whose incapacity could have a debilitating impact on national security, economic security, or public safety. However, Monroe asserts that the national-security strategy has not fully adapted to the technological transformation of the American economy. She proposes that Congress create a specific designation for exceptionally important American-owned or American-controlled digital infrastructure. This designation should be narrow and subject to rigorous requirements to avoid turning every data center into a national-security facility.
Companies seeking this status would need to meet strict standards regarding ownership, cybersecurity, physical security, supply-chain integrity, and cooperation with national-security agencies. The federal government would then identify facilities whose destruction would pose a serious threat to American security. Monroe clarifies that such a designation would not make foreign facilities sovereign American territory. Instead, it would establish a policy that deliberately attacking these assets carries consequences, including sanctions, asset freezes, diplomatic measures, or defensive cyber operations. The goal is deterrence: making the cost of an attack sufficiently clear that an adversary decides the risk is not worth taking.
The author points to President Donald Trump's June 2026 National Security Presidential Memorandum on artificial intelligence, which directed the national-security enterprise to accelerate AI adoption and strengthen partnerships with private industry. Monroe argues that this increases the stakes because adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran have demonstrated willingness to use cyber operations and asymmetric capabilities against American interests. They understand that disrupting power grids, telecommunications networks, or computing infrastructure can achieve strategic goals without direct military confrontation.
Monroe concludes that the United States cannot defend 21st-century power with 20th-century security concepts. While traditional military installations remain essential, the servers and networks that support them are now equally vital. The next major attack on American interests may involve the loss of computing capacity or the disruption of communications networks rather than troops crossing borders. She urges Congress to establish a framework for identifying strategic digital infrastructure and for the administration to work with allies on reciprocal protections for such assets located overseas.
Filed via foxnews.com